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Abstract 
In this study we assess the role played by corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics in determining 
how firms substitute accruals-based earnings management for real earnings management using a sample of forty-
four (44) non-financial companies listed in East African security markets for ten (10) years from 2004-2013. 
With the use of three models and panel data regressions, we found that; managers in East Africa also substitute 
accruals-based earnings management for real earnings management. Moreover, both corporate governance and 
firm-specific characteristics play a major role in determining how firms substitute the two earnings management 
strategies. In addition, among real earnings management strategies, sales manipulation is the most commonly 
used strategy in East Africa. These findings have important implications for policy makers, standard setters and 
regulators such as capital market authorities as well as other researchers in the region. It helps inform them about 
the importance of considering both earnings management strategies as well as both corporate governance and 
firm uniqueness in ensuring the quality of reported financial information. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Firm-specific characteristics, Accrual-based earnings management and Real 
activity manipulation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior studies (Chen, Elder, & Hsieh, 2007; Ching, Firth, & Rui, 2006; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1979; Klein, 2002) suggested that, among other things, effective corporate governance mechanisms provides 
effective control and monitoring mechanisms that are needed to reduce agency conflicts and costs in firms. 
Despite the fact that corporate governance plays a significant role in the process of building investor confidence, 
there have been very few number studies on corporate governance in Africa (Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003). 
Apart from corporate governance practices, firms vary in many ways, therefore, it is also worth considering how 
those differences among firms might influence the quality of reported information. Firm-specific characteristics 
such as firm size, performance, leverage, cash flow are often selected as control variables in most earnings 
management research. These variables usually correlate with the level of accruals, therefore, linked to earnings 
quality. Gaio (2010) pointed out that firm characteristics play a significant role in explaining firm-level earnings 
quality worldwide. As a result, the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management cannot 
be established without controlling for firm’s specific characteristics. 
Earnings management is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted 
accounting principles to bring about the desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidson, Stickney, & Weil, 1987), 
cited in Schipper (1989, p. 92). Earnings management occurs in two ways: (1) via accounting choice1 and (2) via 
real activity manipulation2 (McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Roychowdhury, Kothari, & Mizik, 2012; Schipper, 
1989). However, there is evidence that managers tradeoff (substitute) between accrual-based and real earnings 
management see for example, (Daniel A Cohen, Aiyesha Dey, & Thomas Z Lys, 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; 
Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Katherine Ann Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2011; Zhang, 
2008; Zhu, Lu, Shan, & Zhang). That is when manager’s ability to engage accrual-based earnings management is 
constrained they usually switch to real activity manipulation. Real earnings management alters not only firm’s 
accounting records but also their behavior.  
Therefore, real earnings management have greater effects than accrual earnings management as accrual-based 
earnings management is more prone to scrutiny, therefore, can be easily constrained by auditors and regulators. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance practices and firm-
specific characteristics on the tradeoff between the two earnings management strategies in East Africa. 
East African security markets are newly established and underdeveloped capital markets. The region has a total 
                                                 
1
 Earnings management that occurs via accounting choice is termed as Accrual-based earnings management and is achieved 
by changing the accounting method or estimates used in presenting transactions in financial statements, for example changing 
depreciation policy or estimates for provision for doubtful debts. 
2Real activity manipulation is the departure from normal operational practices, for example offering price discounts to 
temporarily increase sales volume. (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
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of only 103 listed companies as by December 2014. Kenya is the biggest economy in the region and has 61 listed 
companies, followed by Tanzania (21), Uganda (16) and Rwanda (5) while there is no stock exchange in 
Burundi (Outa, 2013). It is abundant in natural resource endowment, such as a recently discoveries of oil and gas 
in Tanzania also has made the region attractive to foreign direct investment and hence increase the world’s 
attention to East Africa. Hence, increase in demand for quality information to attract more foreign capital 
investment in the region. Therefore, against this background, it worth investigating whether listed firms in East 
Africa tradeoff between the two earnings management strategies. Moreover, we also investigate whether 
corporate governance practices and firm-specific characteristics influences the trade-off between accrual-based 
and real earnings management in East Africa.  
We add to the emerging market accounting literature on the tradeoff between the two earnings management 
strategies by providing evidence that East African manager's also substituted accrual-based earnings 
management for real earnings management. Second, we also add to the emerging market accounting literature by 
identifying which strategy of earnings management is preferred most by managers in East Africa. Moreover, the 
evidence in this paper suggests that both corporate governance practices and firm-specific characteristics plays a 
major role in determining how firms substitute the two earnings management strategies. Therefore, these finding 
has important implications for policy makers, standard setters and regulators such as capital market authorities 
(CMAs) as well as other researchers. As it helps inform them about the importance of considering both earnings 
management strategies in order to come up with a definitive conclusion. Also, it helps inform them about the 
importance of considering both corporate governance and firm uniqueness in ensuring the quality of reported 
financial information. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Corporate Governance in East 
Africa. Section 3 Review the relevant previous studies and develop hypotheses for testing. Section 4 describes 
research design of the study. In Section 5 we analyze the empirical results and, finally, Section 6 concludes this 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Prior research on trade-off between accrual-based and real Earnings Management 
Roychowdhury (2006) presented evidence that managers use multiple real earnings management methods ( price 
discount to boost temporarily sales, reduction in discretionary expenditure to improve reported margins and 
overproduction to lower costs of goods sold) in order to avoid reporting losses. Empirical studies also have 
shown evidence that managers tradeoff between the two earnings management strategies; accrual-based and real 
earnings management and they do prefer real earnings management compared to accrual-based earnings 
management because real earnings management is less likely to be scrutinized by auditors and other regulators, 
thus less chance of being detected (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005).  
Zang (2011) studied whether managers use real activities manipulations and accrual-based earnings management 
as substitutes in managing earnings. Their study found a significant negative relationship between the level of 
accrual-based earnings management and the level of real activity manipulation. Indicating that managers can 
tradeoff the two earnings management strategies based on their relative costs and that they adjust the level of 
accrual-based earnings management according to the level of real activities manipulations realized. Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys (2008) investigate whether the passage of SOX reduced earnings management. Their results showed that 
the level of accrual-based earnings management decreases significantly while the level of real earnings 
management increases significantly after the passage of SOX. Indicating that, firms have switched from accrual-
based earnings management to real earnings management after the adoption of the SOX because this strategy is 
hard to detect.  
Therefore, this study examines whether East African firms do substitute accrual-based for real earnings 
management. Therefore our first hypothesis is as follows; 
H1: There is a significant relationship between accrual-based and real earnings management. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Practices and Earnings Management 
Ownership Concentration  
There is no consensus in prior studies regarding the effect of ownership concentration and earnings management. 
Some studies supported the efficient monitoring hypothesis t (Ali, Salleh, & Hassan, 2010; Alves, 2012; 
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) among others. Suggesting that, ownership 
concentration constrains earnings management. These studies found a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Thus suggesting that large 
shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor actively and influence firm management to protect their 
significant investments, which in turn reduces the scope of managerial opportunism to engage in earnings 
management.  
On the other hand, as pointed out earlier that large shareholder or their representatives usually serve as directors 
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of the company that put them in the position to intervene in the firm’s decision-making, and may encourage 
managers to engage in earnings management to maximize their private benefits. Therefore, some studies have 
also documented that earnings management is positively related to ownership concentration (Chang, 2003; Filip 
& Raffournier, 2014). That is, higher ownership concentration in the firm was found to relate to earnings 
management. Whereas, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Farooq and El Jai (2012) found that ownership 
concentration has no significant impact on constraining earnings management. Therefore, it’s hard to predict the 
direction of relationship; as a result, Hypothesis 2a is a non-directional hypothesis; 
H2a:  Firms with high ownership concentration are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management 
than accrual-based earnings management 
Institutional Ownership 
The efficient monitoring hypothesis also suggests that institutional investors can provide active monitoring that 
is difficult for smaller, more passive or less-informed investors. Al-Zyoud (2012), Farooq and El Jai (2012)and 
Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and Jiambalvo (1999) found a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and absolute values of discretionary accruals.  
However, when institutional investors hold relatively few shares and the shares are highly marketable, they are 
more likely to liquidated their holdings in poorly performing firms than to expend their resources in monitoring 
and improving their performance (Maug, 1998). Roychowdhury (2006) also found a negative relation between 
institutional ownership and real activity manipulation to avoid reporting losses. Indicating that, institutional 
investors play a monitoring role in reducing real activity manipulations. Thus, managers find difficult to 
manipulate both real activities and accruals when their operations are being closely monitored by institutional 
investors.Therefore, this study tested the following hypothesis with regards to Institutional ownership; 
H2b: Firms with higher Institutional Ownership are more (less) likely to engage in accrual based earnings 
management than real earnings management 
Managerial Ownership 
The traditional agency literature argued that shareholdings by managers help align their interests with those of 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This alignment effect suggests opportunistic managerial behaviors 
decreases with an increase in managerial ownership. However, the empirical studies provide contradicting 
results. Some studies have found a negative relationship between managerial ownership and earnings 
management for example Alves (2012), Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) and Klein (2002).  
In contrast, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Lennox (2005) and Teshima and Shuto (2008) suggested that, at 
high and low levels of managerial ownership, earnings management decreases as managerial ownership 
increases (alignment of interest effect). While it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership thus 
consistent with the entrenchment effect. Whereas Al-Zyoud (2012) and Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) did 
not find a significant systematic relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. This 
study provides evidence on the relationship between managerial ownership and real activity manipulations too. 
Then, the hypothesis that should be verified is as follows; 
H2c: Firms with high Managerial Ownership are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management 
than Accrual based earnings management 
Board composition/Independence 
Board of Directors plays an important role in monitoring management to protect shareholders’ interest. The role 
of independent non-executive directors is to bring independent judgment to the board; therefore, the board 
composition is associated with confidence in the firm’s financial reporting system. Dechow et al. (1996), Petra 
(2005), Park and Shin (2004), Klein (2002) among others, found a negative relationship between the higher 
proportion of outside directors and abnormal accruals. Whereas, Zgarni, Halioui, and Zehri (2014) found that a 
board comprising of the majority of independent directors reduced the extent of real activity manipulations. Prior 
studies have examined either accrual or real activity manipulation in isolation, (Zang, 2011) suggested, 
examining either type of earnings management in isolation cannot explain the overall effect. Led us to this 
hypothesis; 
H 3a: Firms with a high proportion of independent board members are more (less) likely to engage in real 
earnings management than accrual-based earnings management. 
 Board Size 
Prior studies pointed out that large board (beyond seven or eight people) are less likely to function effectively in 
controlling management due to problems of coordination and communication (Shu, Yeh, Chiu, & Yang). Board 
size has a negative association with earnings management. Thus small boards are more effective and efficient 
than large ones (Ahmed, Hossain, & Adams, 2006; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2010; Vafeas, 2000; Yermack, 1996).  
However, some studies also argued for larger boards. That is larger board brings more resources to the firms 
regarding skills and competence (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). Therefore, the following non directional 
hypothesis was tested; 
H3b: Firms with smaller board size are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management than 
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accrual-based earnings management. 
 Audit Quality 
Audit firm’s size is a proxy for auditors’ reputation and, therefore, the quality of the audit. L. E. DeAngelo (1981) 
argued that large auditor firms (Big N1) are more experienced, and reputation, therefore, can easily detect 
material misstatements in financial statements and they are more willing to report what they find than small audit 
firms. Kim, Chung, and Firth (2003), Francis and Yu (2009), Francis, Maydew, and Sparks (1999), Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) among others, also found that firms audited by the Big N auditors 
have a lower amount of discretionary accruals compared to firms audited by the non-Big N auditors. These 
results were consistency with the notion that Big N auditors constrain aggressiveness and opportunistic 
managerial behavior.  
However, prior studies also argued that as a consequence of constrained accrual earnings management, clients of 
higher quality audits are a likely switch to more real activities manipulation. Chi, Ling, and Mikhail (2010) 
found that the presence of Big 4 auditors is associated with higher levels of real activity manipulations. Because 
accrual-based earnings management is more likely to be detected by high-quality auditors. On the other hand 
Hyo Jin and Soon Suk (2008) for Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms with Big 4 auditors have lower levels of 
both accrual-based and real earnings management. Therefore the hypothesis to be tested is; 
H 3c: Firms audited by Big 4 auditors are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management than 
accrual-based earnings management. 
 
2.3 Firm-Specific Characteristics and Earnings Management 
Firm Size 
The positive accounting theory suggested that managers of larger firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management to reduce political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). On the other hand, managers of large firms 
have fewer opportunities to manage earnings because larger firms are more likely to be closely monitored by 
security analysts (Rajgopal et al., 1999). Large firms also have high-quality internal control and are usually 
audited by the Big 4 auditors, hence less likely to be able to hide abnormal accruals (Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
Therefore, the study predicted larger firms are likely to engage in real activity manipulation because is difficult 
to be detected. That leads to the following hypothesis; 
H 4a: Larger firms are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management than Accrual based earnings 
management. 
Firm Leverage level 
Earlier studies documented that, firms facing financial constraints or distress have strong incentives to utilize 
income increasing accounting procedures to lower the potential loss arising from violation of debt contracts 
(Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994). This argument would predict a positive 
relationship between financial leverage ratio and discretionary accruals. However, Kim et al. (2003) suggested 
that as a firm becomes highly leveraged, its ability to boost earnings through income increasing accruals become 
weaker. Zang (2011) also suggested that the marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies are 
relatively high for firms with poor financial health (highly geared firms). Therefore, managers of these firms 
perceived real activity manipulations as relatively costly compared to accrual-based earnings management as 
their primary goal is to improve operations. Then the hypothesis hereunder; 
H 4b: Highly leveraged firms are more (less) likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management than 
real earnings management. 
Firm Performance 
Empirical evidence suggests that accruals are opportunistically manipulated by managers to conceal poor 
performance, to avoid reporting losses or to postpone of a portion of the unusual good year to the future years 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; H. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994; Liu & Lu, 2007). However, Alves 
(2012) found no evidence that firm performance affects the level of earnings management. Therefore we are not 
able to predict the direction of the relationship. Thus the following non direction hypothesis is proposed for this 
study;  
H 4c: Firms with higher (better) performance are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings management 
than accrual-based earnings management  
Firm cash flow from operation 
Prior studies (Chen et al., 2007; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994) found that, 
firms’ cash flow had a negative relationship with discretionary accounting accruals. High cash flows from 
operation thus high profits, therefore the firm will have less incentive to manipulate discretionary accounting 
                                                 
1
 Currently known as Big Four (4) auditors, were once known as the "Big Eight", and was reduced to the "Big Six" and then 
"Big Five" by a series of mergers. The Big Five became the Big Four after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, following 
its involvement in the Enron scandal 
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accruals. However, as argued by Zang (2011) that the marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies 
are relatively high for firms with poor financial health. Then the hypothesis hereunder; 
H 4d: Firms with high level of cash flow from operations are more (less) likely to engage in real earnings 
management than accrual-based earnings management  
  
3. Conceptual Framework and Research model 
Prior literature suggests corporate governance and firm specific characteristics have impact on the extent of 
earnings management either through accounting choice or real activity manipulations. Moreover, there are also 
evidences that, managers substitute the two earnings management strategies (Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & Lodh, 
2015; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). This study examined the impact of corporate governance 
practices and firm-specific characteristics on the trade-off between the two strategies of earnings management in 
East Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
Source: Researcher (2016) 
 
3.1 Econometric Estimation models 
In order to examine whether the firm’s substitution of accrual-based earnings management for real earnings 
management differs based on different levels of corporate governance practices and firm specific characteristics, 
we extended the econometric estimation model by Braam et al. (2015). As pointed out earlier that real activities 
manipulations usually occur during the fiscal year and realized at the year end, managers still have the chance to 
manipulate the level of accrual-based earnings management (AEM). Thus, the timing difference allows 
managers to adjust the accrual-based earnings management based on the outcomes of the real activity 
manipulation (REM). Therefore we use AEM a dependent variable and REM as independent variable. However, 
prior studies provide evidence that corporate governance practices and firm specific characteristics constrain 
accrual-based earnings management, and once manager’s ability to manipulate accruals is constrained, they do 
shift to real earnings management. Therefore, the relationship between accrual-based (AEM) and real earnings 
management (REM) may differ depending on the level of constraint imposed by corporate governance practices 
and/or firm specific characteristics. Thus, the relationship between AEM and REM is moderated by corporate 
governance practices and firm specific characteristics. Therefore the study included an interactive term REM on 
each corporate governance and firm specific variables. The resulting coefficients indicate the incremental effect 
of each variable on the relationship between AEM and REM. However, we include also all of the corporate 
governance and firm specific variables as an independent variable to control the possibility that each variable has 
a direct influence on AEM. The econometric models to test the research hypotheses were as follows; 
Model 1:  Corporate governance and the tradeoff between accrual-based and real earnings management; 
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Model 2 Firm specific characteristics and the tradeoff between accrual-based and real earnings management; 
 
             
 
 
 
Model 3 Corporate governance, Firm specific characteristics and the tradeoff between accrual-based and real 
earnings management; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where; 
AEM= Accrual-based earnings management measured by modified Jones model 
REM= the sum of the two standardized real earnings management measures 
Other variables definitions see Table 2  
Subscript it= firm i for a period t 
0β
= constant; 1β to 24β  are the regression coefficients to be estimated 
 
3.2  Study sample and period 
The study sample were selected from the population of non-financial companies listed in East African security 
markets for ten (10) years from 2004-2013. The period was chosen because most East African companies were 
listed in the late 2000s. Also, the Code on Corporate Governance was introduced in the region in 2002 and was 
expected that not all companies complied with the code at the initial stage of its implementation. Therefore, to 
avoid the confusion, the researcher selected the year 2004 and 2013 for analysis. However, following the 
standard accounting literature, financial companies were excluded from the study. This is because according to 
(Ali et al., 2010; Klein, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004) financial companies are subject to other regulations that lead 
to more strict guidelines and also because of their specific accounting practices among others. Newly listed firms 
were also excluded due to inadequate data to estimate discretionary accruals. Therefore the study sample 
comprised with forty-four (44) non- financial companies as shown below; 
Total listed companies in East Africa    103 
Less Financial institutions    (37) 
Less: Newly listed firms    (22) 
Final Sample     (44) 
Out of the 44 firms, 33 firms were listed in Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) Kenya, 7 listed in Dar-es-Salaam 
Stock Exchange (DSE) Tanzania and four firms listed in the Uganda Stock Exchange (UGE) Uganda. Whereas, 
no firms from Rwanda and Burundi. All the five firms listed in Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE) were excluded 
from the sample as two firms were financial institutions while the remaining 3 were newly listed firms. Burundi 
does not have a stock exchange. The initial sample included 44 firms for ten (10) year 2004-2013, which is 
equivalent of 440 firm-year observations. However, after omitting missing observations the study remained with 
unbalanced panel data set of between 234 to 441firm-year observations. The 44 firms is the representative of the 
East African Securities Market as some of the companies listed in Kenya, Tanzania or Uganda are also operating 
in Rwanda and Burundi. Outa (2013) also while examining the impact of corporate governance disclosure on 
earnings management in East Africa, had a sample 34 companies with 232 firm-year observations. Thus pointed 
out that in exploratory research, sample sizes of 10-30 are sufficient as they are large enough to test the null 
hypothesis and small enough to overlook weak treatment effects. 
 
3.3 Research Design and Data 
Due to significant variations in a number of firm-year observations caused by capital market development, the 
study adopted a panel data research design, particularly unbalanced panel data where certain years, the data 
category was not observed. The design was chosen because the population is small and the use of panel data 
helps to increase the number of observations as there will be no elimination of firms lacking observations for the 
whole study period (Waweru & Riro, 2013). 
We extensively relayed on secondary data. Consolidated financial statements data necessary for the study were 
obtained from OSIRIS Database that contains data for publicly listed companies worldwide. The study 
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considered the consolidated financial statements as they provide a broad picture of the parent company and its 
subsidiaries. Also because of cross listing (same Company is listed in all the 4 East Africa stock markets). In this 
case only the parent company was considered for the study. The financial statements data collected were in 
Tanzanian shillings, Kenyan shillings and Ugandan shillings for Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda respectively. 
Therefore for comparability, we converted data into US dollar using annual average exchange rates. We obtained 
the exchange rates data from EIU Country Data, a powerful database of annual, quarterly and monthly economic 
indicators and forecasts. Corporate governance variables data were manually collected from annual reports of 
listed companies obtained from the respective countries Stock Exchange markets websites, African Financials’ 
Portal and company’s websites. African Financials’ Portal is a free Annual Reports portal focusing on enhancing 
investment community visibility for African companies. 
3.3.1  Variables Definition and Measurement 
Our dependent variables was the proxy for accrual-based earnings management whereas, the independent 
variables were the proxies for real earnings management, corporate governance practices and/or firm specific 
characteristics. 
Measuring the discretionary accrual component of earnings. 
In measuring discretionary accruals we followed a recent literature (González & García-Meca, 2014). Where the 
cross-sectional variation of the modified Jones model (1991) as proposed by (Dechow et al., 1995) which is the 
most powerful model used in most of earnings management studies was used.  
Consistent with most of previous earnings management studies (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Kim & Yi, 2006; 
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) among others, it is assumed that earnings are managed through accounting 
accruals and the accrual generating process is similar for the companies in the same industry. Thus, while 
estimating the modified Jones (1991) model, companies were grouped according to industry membership as 
classified by the East African Capital market Authorities (CMAs). However, in order to allow for proper 
computation of earnings management variables, the sample was reclassified to have at least five (5) observations 
in each industry-year group by merging together some of industries with some similarity in accounting systems. 
Therefore the final sample comprises of four (4) industries as shown in Table 1 below including their percentage 
of representation in the total firm-year observations. 
 
Table 1: Industry-Year sample classification (reclassified) 
INDUSTRY YEAR 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Firm-year 
observation 
Representation 
Agricultural 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 67 16.03% 
Commercial &Services 5 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 
89 
 
21.29% 
Construction & Allied 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
89 
 
21.29% 
Manufacturing & Allied 12 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
 
173 
 
41.39% 
           418 100% 
From table 2 above, it can be seen that, the manufacturing &Allied industry is well represented. Out of 418 firm-
year observations manufacturing &Allied industry has 173 observations (41.39%). Whereas Construction 
&Allied and Commercial &Services had equal percentage of representation (21.29%) while Agricultural sector 
with the least representation percentage (16.03%). 
We estimated the modified Jones’ model as follows: 
First, we estimate the regression parameters ( 210 , βββ and ) using industry-year regression model below; 
it
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Where; 
itTACC
 Total accruals in year t as computed in equation (ii) above (see equation 2 below 
1, −tiTA
  Total assets at the beginning of year t; 
itREV∆
 Change in revenues;  
PPE  Gross property, plant and equipment  
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
We followed Hribar and Collins (2002) in calculating total accrual (TACC) as follows; 
ititit CFOEARNINGSTACC −=
      (2) 
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Where: 
itTACC
  Total accruals for firm i at time t 
itEARNINGS
 Net income before extra-ordinary items and discontinued operations 
itCFO
   Net Cash flows from operating activities reported in the statement of cash flows. 
Second, we used the estimated regression parameters 210
ˆˆ
,
ˆ βββ and
 to estimate non-discretionary accruals 
(NDAC) for each sample firms. Non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) are the predictions from the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimation of model below; 



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

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
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
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=
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1
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itit
itit
it
it TA
PPE
TA
cv
TA
NDAC βββ
     (3) 
The changes in revenue is now adjusted by the changes in account receivables itREC∆  to allow for the 
possibility that the firm could have manipulated sales by changing credit terms (Dechow et al., 1995) as cited in 
(González & García-Meca, 2014).  
Lastly, discretionary accruals (DAC) are computed as the difference between total accrual and the non-
discretionary accruals; 
it
it
it
it NDACTA
TACCDAC −





=
−1
         (4) 
Following Cohen et al. (2008), the DAC was measured in absolute values ( )[ ]itDACAbs  that is, regardless of 
whether the accrual earnings management is earnings increase or decrease. Absolute values of discretionary 
accruals also captures accrual reversals due to earnings management (Braam et al., 2015). 
Measurement of Real Earnings management 
Following also standard accounting literature (Katherine Ann Gunny, 2005; Katherine A Gunny, 2010; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Roychowdhury et al., 2012). We examined three real activities manipulation: Sales 
manipulation, reduction of discretionary expenditure and overproduction. The abnormal level of each type of 
real activities manipulation was measured as the residual from the relevant estimation model. 
Sales manipulation 
Sale manipulation is the acceleration of the timing of sales through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006). Such discounts and lenient credit terms are expected to lower current-period 
cash inflow per sale. Hence lower current-period cash flow from operations (CFO). Based on (Dechow, Kothari, 
& Watts, 1998), the normal levels of CFO is expressed as a linear function of sales and change in sales; 
t
t
t
t
t
tt
t
TA
S
TA
S
TATA
CFO
εββαα +




 ∆
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

+




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+=
−−−− 1
2
1
1
1
10
1
1
     (5) 
Where;  
CFO The current period cash flow from operations 
1−tTA
  The total assets at the beginning of year t 
tS
  Net sales during the period 
tS∆
 Change in net sales
)( 1−−=∆ ttt SSS
 
The abnormal level of cash flow from operations (Abn_CFO) is measured as deviations from the predicted 
values from the above industry-year regression. Following previous literature (Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and 
Braam et al. (2015)) we estimate our first proxy for real earnings management (REM_CFO®) as the abnormal 
cash flow from operations (Abn_CFO) multiplied by minus (−1), such that a higher value of abnormal cash flow 
from operations indicates more severe manipulation of sales through price discount and/or more lenient credit 
terms. 
Overproduction  
Our second type of real activity manipulation was overproduction (the production of more goods than necessary 
to meet expected demand). Overproduction reduces cost of goods sold (COGS), which results in higher 
operating margin. Production cost is the total of COGS and Inventory. Since, delaying write-offs of obsolete 
inventory reduces the COGS but increases the cost of ending inventory (Roychowdhury, 2006). The model for 
normal level of COGS is estimated as; 
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Where; 
COGS  is the cost of goods sold in period t 
1−tTA
  is the total assets at the beginning of year t 
tS
  is the sales during the period 
 
Whereas, the normal level of inventory is estimated as; 
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Where; 
tINVENTORY∆
 is the change in Inventory in period t 
1−tTA
   is the total assets at the beginning of year t 
tS∆
   is change in sales during the period t
( )1−−=∆ ttt SSS
 
1−∆ tS
   is the change in the previous period sales ( )211 −−− −=∆ ttt SSS   
 
The production cost for firm i in period t is estimated ttt INVENTORYCOGSPROD ∆+= .Thus using 
model (6) and model (7) above, we estimated the normal production cost by the following industry-year 
regression;  
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Where;  
tPROD
 is the Production cost ( tt INVENTORYCOGS ∆+ ) 
1−tTA
  is the total assets at the beginning of year t 
tS
  is the sales during the period 
tS∆
  is change in sales during the period ( )1−−=∆ ttt SSS  
1−∆ tS
  is the change in previous period sales ( )211 −−− −=∆ ttt SSS   
The abnormal level of production cost (REM_PROD) for every firm-year is the measured as deviations from the 
predicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression. A higher value of abnormal production cost 
indicates more manipulation through increased overproduction. 
Reduction of discretionary expenses 
Another type of real activity manipulation is discretionary expense (DEXP). Managers can reduce discretionary 
expenditure to boost earnings. Again following (Roychowdhury, 2006), DEXP was measured as the sum of 
Research and Development costs (R&D), advertising, and Selling, general and administrative (SG&A) 
expenditure. The model is based on the assumption that discretionary expenditure is a linear function of sales. 
However, we were not able to estimate the reduction of discretionary expenditure because all the firms in East 
Africa do not report separately research and development expenditure (R&D), selling, general and administrative 
expenditure. Thus to avoid additional reduction in number observations our study considered only two real 
activity manipulations (sales manipulation and overproduction). 
Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Braam et al. (2015) in order to capture the aggregate effects of 
real earnings management, the two individual real earnings management measures are combined together to 
form a single variable aggregate real earnings management (REM). The REM is computed as the sum of 
standardized variable REM_CFO multiplied by minus (−1) and standardized variable REM_PROD, such that a 
higher value of this aggregate variable indicate the more likely the firm is engaging in real earnings management. 
That is more severe manipulation of sales through either price discount or more lenient credit terms and 
production manipulations. 
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3.3.3  Operational definitions of other independent and control variables 
Table 2 below provide the operational definitions of corporate governance, firm specific and control variables of 
the study 
Table 2: Operational definitions of variables 
Independent variables  Operational definition  Source(s) of data  
Corporate Governance Practices  
Ownership structure 
Ownership concentration 
(CONC) 
Proportion of total company’s share held by the 
largest stockholder (large shareholders participate in 
costly monitoring)(Jeeshim & Kucc, 2002) 
Company annual reports  
Institutional ownership 
(INST) 
Proportion of total company’s share held by 
institutional investors. Institutional investors are; 
Insurance companies, Pension Funds, investment 
companies, banks and other financial institutions 
(Koh, 2003)  
Company annual reports 
Managerial ownership 
(MAN) 
Proportion of the total company’s shares directly 
owned by the manager/directors of the company  
Company annual reports 
Board Size (BSIZE) Is the number of directors (executive and non-
executive) serving on the board at fiscal year-end. 
Company annual reports 
Board Composition 
(BINDP) 
The proportion of independent board members (non-
executive) serving on the board at fiscal year-end. 
That is the number of independent non-executive 
directors to the total the number of directors on the 
board 
Company annual reports 
Audit Quality (AUDIT) Dichotomous, 1 or 0  
One (1) for Big Four (4), otherwise zero (0) 
Company annual reports 
Firm specific characteristics  
Firm size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of Total assets  OSIRIS 
Performance (ROA) Operating performance measured by Return on 
assets (ROA). Earnings before interest and Tax to 
total assets 
OSIRIS 
Leverage (LEV) Gearing ratio that compares owner's equity (or 
capital) to borrowed funds. Is a measure of financial 
leverage, demonstrating the degree to which a firm's 
activities are funded by owner's funds versus 
creditor's funds 
OSIRIS 
Cash flow (CFO) Cash flows from operations from the statement of 
cash flows 
Company annual reports 
Control Variables  
Systematic risk (BETA) 36 month Market model beta OSIRIS 
Firm growth opportunities 
(MTB) 
Market to book value ratio, measured as a ratio of 
market value of shares to book value of shares 
OSIRIS 
Earnings variability 
(VOLATILITY) 
Is the coefficient of variation of earnings for the 
previous 5 years (Sánchez‐Ballesta & García‐
Meca, 2007) 
OSIRIS 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The results of the descriptive statistics are shown in table 4 below. The variable firm size (SIZE) had the largest 
number of observation in the study with (N=441) while market to book value ratio (MTB) had the minimum 
number of observations (N=269). The variation in firm-year observations between variables could be explained 
by the immaturity of the stock markets in East Africa. Most of stock market data are only available form year 
2007. East African companies’ managerial ownership range from 0 to 47.47%, with an average of 1.70395% and 
a median of 0.00304, indicating that with exception of very few firms, majority of firms’ directors have very few 
or have not bought shares of the company at all. East African companies as most of other developing economies, 
it can be described as having concentrated ownership (closely owned) as opposed to dispersed ownership, as the 
mean ownership by largest shareholder is 48.27% with a minimum of 11.59% and a maximum of 92.26%. On 
average board of directors in East Africa have 8 members (mean=7.9) with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 
16 members. The median board size is 8 members, indicating that the sample contains an equal number of larger 
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boards and smaller boards. The average board independence is 78%, with a minimum 33.33% and a maximum 
of 114.28%. Because the data were not available to enable the researcher differentiate non-executive directors 
and independent directors1, in this particular study board independence is defined as the percentage of non-
executive directors in the board. The minimum proportion of independent directors is in line with the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) criteria that mandated all listed public companies to have at least one-third (1/3 ) of the 
total Directors to be independent. Firm specific characteristics descriptive statistics also revealed the average 
firm size is equivalent to US dollars 10.8611 million; the median is US dollars 10.905 million, indicating that the 
sample represents equally large firms and small firms. On average Beta is 0.3048627 that means the beta is 
below 1, hence the stocks traded in East African stock markets are less volatile. 
The descriptive statistics were also intended to exhibit the distribution of data. The data are considered to be 
normally distributed if the standard skewness is within the range of ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is within the 
range of ±3 (Field, 2005). The descriptive statistics indicates that the data are not normally distributed hence 
more attention is required in the analysis and interpretation of the results. 
Table 3: Summary statistics for the variables in the analysis 
  Mean Median 
Standard  
deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis N 
Dependent variable 
AEM 0.2624234 0.0559333 1.009405 0.0000149 11.74808 7.597098 71.60444 397 
Independent variables: Corporate governance practices 
REM -0.0209157 0.0046587 1.056344 -4.490656 3.738496 -0.0872752 5.11155 353 
REM_CFO ® 1.82E-10 7.01E-08 0.8507301 -6.476089 5.835203 1.024709 33.85971 397 
REM_PROD 2.57E-07 0.0001467 0.1799196 -0.5890287 0.5465105 -0.0482499 4.365774 354 
INST 14.89749 10.84 15.66671 0 75.55 1.882937 6.658179 402 
CONC 48.27661 50.93 16.94793 11.59 92.26 -0.0545841 2.214391 402 
MAN 1.70395 0.00304 6.464497 0 47.47 5.109663 31.10413 402 
AUDT 0.9651741 1 0.183567 0 1 -5.074482 26.75037 402 
BSIZE 7.902985 8 2.556697 2 16 0.3376889 3.066443 402 
BINDP 78.3379 83.33334 15.30082 33.33333 114.2857 -1.324919 4.509807 402 
SIZE 10.86111 10.90546 1.697952 4.579565 14.73304 -0.2662456 3.10652 441 
Independent variables: Firm specific characteristics 
ROA 14.2401 10.8951 15.64158 -36.6 67.56 0.5187527 3.998404 400 
LEV 123.194 87.4977 104.9591 16.38879 749.8914 2.318261 10.95414 398 
CFO 22160.12 3496.281 61991.57 -477296.2 462908.8 2.044065 28.86146 415 
Control variables 
MTB 26.81691 1.467629 339.1093 -14.53433 5544.321 16.10898 262.4875 269 
BETA 0.3048627 0.304691 0.283993 -0.235289 1.106475 0.7464039 3.836505 336 
VOLATILITY 0.557211 0.0409457 5.406648 0.0017117 59.28568 10.78391 117.3093 358 
 * Statistical significance at 10% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, *** Statistical significance at 1% 
level 
AEM- absolute discretionary accrual a proxy of Accrual-based earnings management measured by Modified 
Jones model (1995); REM- aggregate real earnings management [standardized Abn_PROD+ (standardized 
Abn_CFO*-1)]; Abn_PROD- Abnormal production cost, an individual proxy for real earnings management; 
REM_CFO®- reversed Abnormal cash flow from operations, a second individual proxy for real earnings 
management; MAN- managerial ownership; CONC- Ownership concentration;  INST- Institutional ownership;
 BSIZE- Board size; BINDP- Board Independence; AUDIT- Audit Quality; ROA- Return  on assets; 
LEV- Leverage ratio; CFO- Cash flow from operations;  SIZE- Firm size; VOLATILITY- Earnings variability; 
BETA- Market model beta; MTB- Market to book value ratio 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Real earnings management is not a new phenomenon in East Africa. Figure 2 below indicates a similar trend of 
accrual-based and real earnings management. That is as real earnings management increase accrual-based 
earnings management also increases. Suggesting that, managers in East Africa use both earnings management 
strategies at the same time. However, the REM graph lay above AEM graph throughout the sample period. 
Suggesting that, managers in east Africa prefer most real earnings management than accrual-based earnings 
management probably because it is harder to detect. These results are consistent with Graham et al. (2005) 
survey findings that managers prefer real activities manipulation than accruals manipulations. 
                                                 
1
 Independent Directors do not own shares in the company. But for this study the independent directors are the non-executive 
directors who might also happen to be shareholders. 
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Figure 2 Time trend of Accrual-based and real earnings management 
Both earnings management strategies peaked in 2010- 2011 and there was prompt fall in 2012 and the peaked 
again in 2013. The possible explanation for the two peaks is that, the period was characterized political stress 
due General elections. General elections were held in Tanzania in 2010, Uganda 2011 and Kenya 2013. During 
the year 2011 Uganda also faces a potential oil shock. Filip and Raffournier (2014) argued that, earnings 
management should be higher in periods of economic stress. As in such periods, most firms probably exhibit 
lower earnings, which should motivate managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management to 
compensate for the decrease of operational performance. Our results are consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) who 
also found a peak in 2000, which was the scandal period and interpreted that the scandal period was 
characterized by high earnings management activities. 
Among the proxies of earnings management sales manipulations (Abs_abnCFO) is practices most in East Africa. 
Abnormal production cost variable shows a slight increase during the sample period. Thus indicating the 
abnormal cash flow contributed mainly to the aggregate real earnings management trend above. 
 
Figure 3 Time-trend of real earnings management proxies 
 
4.1 Correlation analysis 
As indicated by the descriptive statistics that the data are non- parametric data therefore we use Spearman's Rank 
correlation. As indicated by the analysis of the trend, the study also found positive correlation but insignificant 
between accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and all the proxies for real earnings management (REM, 
REM_CFO® and REM_PROD). Suggesting that, managers in East Africa use both earnings management 
strategies at the same time. 
None of the ownership structure has significant effect on accrual-based earnings management (AEM) indicating 
that, in East Africa, ownership structure has no impact on constraining accrual-based earnings management. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.8, 2016 
 
151 
However, ownership concentration (CONC) and institutional ownership (INST) were negatively and 
significantly correlated with all the three real earnings management measures. Suggesting that, ownership 
concentration and institutional ownership reduces real activity manipulations. Managerial ownership (MAN) has 
positively and highly significant correlation with abnormal production measure of real earnings management. 
Indicating that, firms with higher managerial ownership also have abnormal production activities. A negative 
correlation between Managerial and Concentration indicates that managers’ equity interest in the firm is 
declining as ownership concentration increases. Institutional ownership is also negatively and highly significant 
correlated with ownership concentration (CONC), reflecting the fact that institutions are not block holders. As 
expected, audit quality is negatively and significant correlated with accrual-based earnings management, 
indicating that the big 4 auditors constrains accrual based earnings management. However, it is also negatively 
correlated with all the three measures of real earnings management. Indicating that big 4 auditors may constrain 
both types of earnings management. The results are consistent with Hyo Jin and Soon Suk (2008) who found that, 
for Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms with Big 4 auditors have low levels of both accrual-based and real 
earnings management. Board size seems to have a significant impact on all types of ownership structure and 
audit quality.  
Table 4 Spearman's Rank correlation 
 
* Statistical significance at 10% level, ** Statistical significance at 5% level, *** Statistical significance at 1% 
level 
AEM- absolute discretionary accrual a proxy of Accrual-based earnings management measured by Modified 
Jones model (1995); REM- aggregate real earnings management [standardized Abn_PROD+ (standardized 
Abn_CFO*-1)]; Abn_PROD- Abnormal production cost, an individual proxy for real earnings management; 
REM_CFO®- reversed Abnormal cash flow from operations, a second individual proxy for real earnings 
management; MAN- managerial ownership; CONC- Ownership concentration;  INST- Institutional ownership;
 BSIZE- Board size; BINDP- Board Independence; AUDIT- Audit Quality; ROA- Return  on assets; 
LEV- Leverage ratio; CFO- Cash flow from operations;  SIZE- Firm size; VOLATILITY- Earnings variability; 
BETA- Market model beta; MTB- Market to book value ra Ownership concentration and managerial ownership 
has negative relationship while institutional ownership has positive relationship. Indicating that, highly 
concentrated firms and firms with higher managerial ownership prefer small boards of directors whereas firms 
with higher institutional ownership prefer also larger boards. Board size is positively and significant correlated 
with audit quality, suggesting larger boards more audit quality.  
This could be explained by the fact that board of directors (through its audit committee) selects the external 
auditor and the external auditor report to audit committee whereas firms with small boards may not have 
effective audit committee due to limited number of competencies in the board. Firm size is negatively correlated 
with all earnings management proxies. Suggesting that large firms have low earnings management activities. 
(Siregar & Utama, 2008) also found that large firms have high-quality internal control and are usually audited by 
the Big 4 auditors, hence less likely to be able to hide abnormal accruals 
However, the significant positive impact on audit quality, board size, board independence indicate that large 
firms tend to be audited by the big four auditors, have larger boards of directors and more independent boards. 
Managerial is negatively correlated with Size, suggesting that managers’ equity interest in the firm is declining 
as firm size increases. The correlation is significant positive between firm’s performance and cash flow 
indicating firms that performs well also generate higher cash flow from operations have low real earnings 
management activities. Firm’s leverage ratio has positive and highly significant correlation with both accrual-
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based and real earnings management, suggesting that an increase in leverage encourages managers to manipulate 
earnings to avoid debt covenant violation. Among the control variables, market to book value ratio (MTB) and 
earnings variability (VOLATILITY) had negative and highly significant relationship with all the three real 
earnings management measures. 
Spearman's rank correlation also show that the magnitude of correlation between the variable aggregate real 
earnings management (REM) and abnormal cash flow (Abn_CFO) is pretty high (Spearman’s .9807 p=0.000). 
Hence it is reasonable to suggest that REM causes multicollinearity in the model. This could be explained by the 
fact that the aggregate measure of real earnings management is the sum the two standardized measures of real 
earnings management, therefore the two variables measures the same concept. Therefore the study considered 
only the aggregate measure (REM) for the analysis. However, all other variables the matrices show that the 
correlation coefficients are less than the limit or cut off correlation percentage of 90%.  
 
4.2 Longitudinal Panel Regression Results 
Consistent with previous studies (Braam et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010), we also 
found negative and highly significant results at 1% and 5% level between real earnings management and accrual-
based earnings management. Suggesting that, managers substitute real earnings management for accrual-based 
earnings management. Thus, the results in land support to hypothesis 1 of the study. 
Except for audit quality, none of the corporate governance practice alone had significant impact. However, the 
interaction between managerial ownership and real earnings management is negative and highly significant for 
both model 1 and model 3, suggesting that firms with higher managerial ownership has higher real earnings 
management than accrual manipulations. Thus hypothesis 2c is supported. 
Table 5: Panel Data regression Results 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test) 
For the definition of variables see Table 2 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.8, 2016 
 
153 
In contrast with previous studies, the interaction between board independence and real earnings management is 
positive and highly significant at 1% level, suggesting that board independence weakens the negative association 
between the two earnings management strategies. Thus, firms with high board independence engage more in 
both earnings management strategies. The possible explanation here is as pointed out earlier the definition of 
board independence in this study was the non-executive directors, some of them also happen to be shareholders 
of the organization. Thus they are not real independent directors. These findings are in line with other East 
African studies (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Outa, 2013) among others, also found insignificant relationship 
between board independence and earnings management. Arguing that, in East Africa, independent directors 
nominally are not independent enough or not really independent at all. 
Regarding firm-specific characteristics, individually also, firm’s level of cash flow from operations has a 
significant effect on accrual-based earnings management. However, almost all firm-specific characteristics 
variables had a significant moderating effect on the relationship between accrual-based and real earnings 
management. 
Regarding control variables, except for the market to book value ratio (MTB), none of the control variables had a 
significant effect. We found that after controlling for real earnings management and other factors that has impact 
accrual-based earnings management MTB is negatively (but insignificant for Model 1 and Model 3) and highly 
significant (for Model 2) correlated with accrual-based earnings management. Indicating that, firms with high 
growth opportunities have less incentive to manipulate accruals. The measure of systematic risk BETA also was 
omitted form fixed effect regression because fixed effects models do not estimate the effects of variables whose 
values do not change across time. This variable was measured using 36month BETA that was constant 
throughout the sample period. However, although omitted its contribution to the variation in the dependent 
variable is observed in the overall fixed effect. 
Concerning the overall significance of the models, Model 3 that combines both firm specific characteristics and 
corporate governance produced the most powerful results (the overall R2= 49.15%) compared to 16.52% and 
39.62% for model 1 and model 2 respectively. Suggesting that, in East Africa firm characteristics play an 
important role in explaining the variations between accrual based and real earnings management than corporate 
governance practices. However, there was a substantial increase in R2 when firm specific characteristics and 
corporate governance practices were combined together in Model 3. The F-statistic is also highly significant, 
indicating the joint significance of firm specific characteristics and corporate governance practices in explaining 
the variations between accrual-based and real earnings management. Therefore, both firm specific characteristics 
and corporate governance practices plays an important role in explaining the variations between accrual based 
and real earnings management. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Our results reinforce the study's general argument that managers do tradeoff between the two earnings 
management strategies. Moreover, both corporate governance and firm specific characteristics plays an 
important role in determining how firms substitute accruals-based earnings management for real earnings 
management. In addition, among real earnings management strategies, sales manipulation is the most commonly 
used strategy in East Africa. 
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